Irrationality Re-Examined: A Few Comments on the Conjunction Fallacy
In this paper, I argue that the probability model used to infer irrationality for the subjects in the famous Linda problem is not appropriate, and I suggest different approaches based on fuzzy reasoning models. My line of argument is two-fold: 1) If the term “probability” is understood properly (mat...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| منشور في: |
2016
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| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | http://hdl.handle.net/11675/817 http://www.scirp.org/journal/PaperInformation.aspx?PaperID=32162 |
| الوسوم: |
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| الملخص: | In this paper, I argue that the probability model used to infer irrationality for the subjects in the famous Linda problem is not appropriate, and I suggest different approaches based on fuzzy reasoning models. My line of argument is two-fold: 1) If the term “probability” is understood properly (mathematically), then the experimenters used the wrong model. 2) If the term “probability” is understood casually (non- mathematically), then alternative models perhaps should be used to justify the subjects’ responses. The objective is to experiment with new ways of looking at irrationality and raise a discussion regarding the relation between irrationality, reasoning errors and logical models that are used as frameworks to study irrationality. |
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