Saving Morality: A Case against Moral Neutralism
The purpose of this paper is to defend a position in metaethics, saving morality from certain reductionist attempts, and arguing that a moral point of view denotes a distinct attitude toward the world with a set of relatively stable conditions. I discuss the problem of demarcation between the moral...
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2012
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/11675/780 http://studiahumana.com/art,The-second-issue,Saving-Morality-A-Case-against-Moral-Neutralism.html |
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| _version_ | 1870679719235551233 |
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| author | Zavaliy, Andrei |
| author_facet | Zavaliy, Andrei |
| author_role | author |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Zavaliy, Andrei |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2012 2016-04-07T08:38:10Z 2016-04-07T08:38:10Z |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | http://hdl.handle.net/11675/780 http://studiahumana.com/art,The-second-issue,Saving-Morality-A-Case-against-Moral-Neutralism.html |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv | Studia Humana |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Saving Morality: A Case against Moral Neutralism |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Journal Article Peer-Reviewed info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion |
| description | The purpose of this paper is to defend a position in metaethics, saving morality from certain reductionist attempts, and arguing that a moral point of view denotes a distinct attitude toward the world with a set of relatively stable conditions. I discuss the problem of demarcation between the moral and the non-moral domains, and contrast the two basic approaches – moral neutralism and moral descriptivism. Moral neutralism is defined as a view which builds no content requirements into the definition of moral rules, whereas moral descriptivism or essentialism places identifiable constraints on the content of an action-guiding principle if such a principle is to count as a moral, as opposed to a non-moral, rule. I show that adopting neutralism is tantamount to giving up ethical theory as a scholarly activity with a distinct subject matter altogether. It is further argued that W. Frankena’s essentialist definition of morality, as well as a more recent view of Catherine Wilson, share a similar weakness and fall short from neutralizing neutralism. Finally, I propose a modification to the essentialist account of morality, which would significantly increase the resilience of such an account to attempts of reducing moral prescriptions to any action-guiding policy whatsoever, as long as such policy is sincerely adhered to and followed consistently. The proposed modification is described as a Realism constraint, and it refers to the connection between one’s expectations of the outcome of observing a prohibition or following a certain rule and the actual consequences of following a given policy. |
| id | AUKR_3563552fb51e8d65c5f5827b4e0fbe92 |
| network_acronym_str | AUKR |
| network_name_str | AU Kuwait Rep |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:dspace.auk.edu.kw:11675/780 |
| publishDate | 2012 |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| spelling | Saving Morality: A Case against Moral NeutralismZavaliy, AndreiThe purpose of this paper is to defend a position in metaethics, saving morality from certain reductionist attempts, and arguing that a moral point of view denotes a distinct attitude toward the world with a set of relatively stable conditions. I discuss the problem of demarcation between the moral and the non-moral domains, and contrast the two basic approaches – moral neutralism and moral descriptivism. Moral neutralism is defined as a view which builds no content requirements into the definition of moral rules, whereas moral descriptivism or essentialism places identifiable constraints on the content of an action-guiding principle if such a principle is to count as a moral, as opposed to a non-moral, rule. I show that adopting neutralism is tantamount to giving up ethical theory as a scholarly activity with a distinct subject matter altogether. It is further argued that W. Frankena’s essentialist definition of morality, as well as a more recent view of Catherine Wilson, share a similar weakness and fall short from neutralizing neutralism. Finally, I propose a modification to the essentialist account of morality, which would significantly increase the resilience of such an account to attempts of reducing moral prescriptions to any action-guiding policy whatsoever, as long as such policy is sincerely adhered to and followed consistently. The proposed modification is described as a Realism constraint, and it refers to the connection between one’s expectations of the outcome of observing a prohibition or following a certain rule and the actual consequences of following a given policy.2016-04-07T08:38:10Z2016-04-07T08:38:10Z2012Journal ArticlePeer-Reviewedinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersionhttp://hdl.handle.net/11675/780http://studiahumana.com/art,The-second-issue,Saving-Morality-A-Case-against-Moral-Neutralism.htmlStudia Humanaoai:dspace.auk.edu.kw:11675/7802022-01-13T09:22:03Z |
| spellingShingle | Saving Morality: A Case against Moral Neutralism Zavaliy, Andrei |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Saving Morality: A Case against Moral Neutralism |
| title_full | Saving Morality: A Case against Moral Neutralism |
| title_fullStr | Saving Morality: A Case against Moral Neutralism |
| title_full_unstemmed | Saving Morality: A Case against Moral Neutralism |
| title_short | Saving Morality: A Case against Moral Neutralism |
| title_sort | Saving Morality: A Case against Moral Neutralism |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/11675/780 http://studiahumana.com/art,The-second-issue,Saving-Morality-A-Case-against-Moral-Neutralism.html |