Bargaining with linked disagreement points

In the context of bilateral bargaining, we deal with issue linkage by developing a two-issue-two-players cooperative bargaining model. The axioms we propose focus on the role of the disagreement points. A family of bargaining rule stands out: the monotonic equal net ratio solutions. These solutions...

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Main Author: Leroux, Justin (author)
Other Authors: Marrouch, Walid (author)
Format: conferenceObject
Published: 2011
Online Access:http://hdl.handle.net/10725/2972
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762669
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1762669
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author Leroux, Justin
author2 Marrouch, Walid
author2_role author
author_facet Leroux, Justin
Marrouch, Walid
author_role author
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Leroux, Justin
Marrouch, Walid
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2011
2016-01-28T12:23:18Z
2016-01-28T12:23:18Z
2017-10-12
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10725/2972
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762669
Leroux, J., & Marrouch, W. (2011). Bargaining with linked disagreement points. CIRANO-Scientific Publication, (2011s-30).
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1762669
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv en
dc.rights.*.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Bargaining with linked disagreement points
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Conference Paper / Proceeding
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
description In the context of bilateral bargaining, we deal with issue linkage by developing a two-issue-two-players cooperative bargaining model. The axioms we propose focus on the role of the disagreement points. A family of bargaining rule stands out: the monotonic equal net ratio solutions. These solutions point to Pareto efficient outcomes such that the relative gains for players are equal across issues and reward the players for improving their bargaining power over each issue. We discuss our results in light of international trade and environmental negotiations, which are often put on the bargaining table in a linked fashion.
eu_rights_str_mv openAccess
format conferenceObject
id LAURepo_15ff5c5bf1a5343ca20754a783c470a3
identifier_str_mv Leroux, J., & Marrouch, W. (2011). Bargaining with linked disagreement points. CIRANO-Scientific Publication, (2011s-30).
language_invalid_str_mv en
network_acronym_str LAURepo
network_name_str Lebanese American University repository
oai_identifier_str oai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/2972
publishDate 2011
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spelling Bargaining with linked disagreement pointsLeroux, JustinMarrouch, WalidIn the context of bilateral bargaining, we deal with issue linkage by developing a two-issue-two-players cooperative bargaining model. The axioms we propose focus on the role of the disagreement points. A family of bargaining rule stands out: the monotonic equal net ratio solutions. These solutions point to Pareto efficient outcomes such that the relative gains for players are equal across issues and reward the players for improving their bargaining power over each issue. We discuss our results in light of international trade and environmental negotiations, which are often put on the bargaining table in a linked fashion.PublishedN/A2016-01-28T12:23:18Z2016-01-28T12:23:18Z20112017-10-12Conference Paper / Proceedinginfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjecthttp://hdl.handle.net/10725/2972http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762669Leroux, J., & Marrouch, W. (2011). Bargaining with linked disagreement points. CIRANO-Scientific Publication, (2011s-30).https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1762669eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/29722021-03-18T13:42:16Z
spellingShingle Bargaining with linked disagreement points
Leroux, Justin
status_str publishedVersion
title Bargaining with linked disagreement points
title_full Bargaining with linked disagreement points
title_fullStr Bargaining with linked disagreement points
title_full_unstemmed Bargaining with linked disagreement points
title_short Bargaining with linked disagreement points
title_sort Bargaining with linked disagreement points
url http://hdl.handle.net/10725/2972
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1762669
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1762669