Board changes and CEO turnover
The board independence requirements enacted in conjunction with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provided motivation for firms that were already compliant with the regulations to alter their board structure. We consider actual board changes made by compliant firms and how such changes affect the...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلفون آخرون: | , |
| التنسيق: | article |
| منشور في: |
2014
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| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/3882 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.01.006 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037842661400020X |
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إضافة وسم
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| _version_ | 1864513462469656576 |
|---|---|
| author | Dah, Mustafa A. |
| author2 | Frye, Melissa B. Hurst, Matthew |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Dah, Mustafa A. Frye, Melissa B. Hurst, Matthew |
| author_role | author |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Dah, Mustafa A. Frye, Melissa B. Hurst, Matthew |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2014 2016-05-26T09:21:20Z 2016-05-26T09:21:20Z 2016-05-26 |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | 0378-4266 http://hdl.handle.net/10725/3882 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.01.006 Dah, M. A., Frye, M. B., & Hurst, M. (2014). Board changes and CEO turnover: The unanticipated effects of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Journal of Banking & Finance, 41, 97-108. http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037842661400020X |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv | en |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv | Journal of Banking & Finance |
| dc.rights.*.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Board changes and CEO turnover The unanticipated effects of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| description | The board independence requirements enacted in conjunction with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provided motivation for firms that were already compliant with the regulations to alter their board structure. We consider actual board changes made by compliant firms and how such changes affect the monitoring efficiency of the boards. We find that the majority of compliant firms (approximately 56%) add independent directors following SOX. However, we find a nontrivial number of firms (approximately 26%) actually decrease the number of independent directors to move closer to the stated 50% requirement. For firms that decrease independence, the CEO turnover performance sensitivity significantly decreases following SOX. We also find that large board independence changes seem to be most detrimental to the monitoring function of the board. Our results highlight that SOX may have had unintended consequences. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | LAURepo_2af8c9d203ebd11c3feb5f546e90fcba |
| identifier_str_mv | 0378-4266 Dah, M. A., Frye, M. B., & Hurst, M. (2014). Board changes and CEO turnover: The unanticipated effects of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Journal of Banking & Finance, 41, 97-108. |
| language_invalid_str_mv | en |
| network_acronym_str | LAURepo |
| network_name_str | Lebanese American University repository |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/3882 |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| spelling | Board changes and CEO turnoverThe unanticipated effects of the Sarbanes–Oxley ActDah, Mustafa A.Frye, Melissa B.Hurst, MatthewThe board independence requirements enacted in conjunction with the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) provided motivation for firms that were already compliant with the regulations to alter their board structure. We consider actual board changes made by compliant firms and how such changes affect the monitoring efficiency of the boards. We find that the majority of compliant firms (approximately 56%) add independent directors following SOX. However, we find a nontrivial number of firms (approximately 26%) actually decrease the number of independent directors to move closer to the stated 50% requirement. For firms that decrease independence, the CEO turnover performance sensitivity significantly decreases following SOX. We also find that large board independence changes seem to be most detrimental to the monitoring function of the board. Our results highlight that SOX may have had unintended consequences.N/A2016-05-26T09:21:20Z2016-05-26T09:21:20Z20142016-05-26Articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article0378-4266http://hdl.handle.net/10725/3882http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.01.006Dah, M. A., Frye, M. B., & Hurst, M. (2014). Board changes and CEO turnover: The unanticipated effects of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act. Journal of Banking & Finance, 41, 97-108.http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.phphttp://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037842661400020XenJournal of Banking & Financeinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/38822021-03-19T09:10:08Z |
| spellingShingle | Board changes and CEO turnover Dah, Mustafa A. |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Board changes and CEO turnover |
| title_full | Board changes and CEO turnover |
| title_fullStr | Board changes and CEO turnover |
| title_full_unstemmed | Board changes and CEO turnover |
| title_short | Board changes and CEO turnover |
| title_sort | Board changes and CEO turnover |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/3882 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2014.01.006 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S037842661400020X |