Captive funds and banks' capital

A simple leverage ratio restriction is not efficient because it does not discriminate between risky and safe banks.We use a structural and comprehensive model of the firm’s asset growth to describe the equity buyout portfolios’ stylized facts for two types of banks.We derive a leverage ratio that de...

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التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلف الرئيسي: Arayssi, Mahmoud (author)
التنسيق: conferenceObject
منشور في: 2018
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:http://hdl.handle.net/10725/7415
http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64912/
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author Arayssi, Mahmoud
author_facet Arayssi, Mahmoud
author_role author
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Arayssi, Mahmoud
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2018-04-18T13:06:46Z
2018-04-18T13:06:46Z
2018-04-18
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv http://hdl.handle.net/10725/7415
Arayssi, M. (2015). Captive Funds and Banks' Capital.
http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64912/
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv en
dc.rights.*.fl_str_mv info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Captive funds and banks' capital
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Conference Paper / Proceeding
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObject
description A simple leverage ratio restriction is not efficient because it does not discriminate between risky and safe banks.We use a structural and comprehensive model of the firm’s asset growth to describe the equity buyout portfolios’ stylized facts for two types of banks.We derive a leverage ratio that depends on the level of risky investments, and balances between the spread on such investments, the cost of capital and the overall power of the supervisor to enforce the capital requirements. This method is more transparent and requires fewer parameters than other commonly used methods. We obtain an incentive-compatible constraint on banks to carry the minimal adequate amount of capital. This constraint enhances the supervisors’ ability to enforce the rules ex post, and provide banks with a further incentive to reveal their risk type truthfully.
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identifier_str_mv Arayssi, M. (2015). Captive Funds and Banks' Capital.
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network_name_str Lebanese American University repository
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spelling Captive funds and banks' capitalArayssi, MahmoudA simple leverage ratio restriction is not efficient because it does not discriminate between risky and safe banks.We use a structural and comprehensive model of the firm’s asset growth to describe the equity buyout portfolios’ stylized facts for two types of banks.We derive a leverage ratio that depends on the level of risky investments, and balances between the spread on such investments, the cost of capital and the overall power of the supervisor to enforce the capital requirements. This method is more transparent and requires fewer parameters than other commonly used methods. We obtain an incentive-compatible constraint on banks to carry the minimal adequate amount of capital. This constraint enhances the supervisors’ ability to enforce the rules ex post, and provide banks with a further incentive to reveal their risk type truthfully.N/A2018-04-18T13:06:46Z2018-04-18T13:06:46Z2018-04-18Conference Paper / Proceedinginfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/conferenceObjecthttp://hdl.handle.net/10725/7415Arayssi, M. (2015). Captive Funds and Banks' Capital.http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.phphttps://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64912/eninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/74152021-03-19T09:10:13Z
spellingShingle Captive funds and banks' capital
Arayssi, Mahmoud
status_str publishedVersion
title Captive funds and banks' capital
title_full Captive funds and banks' capital
title_fullStr Captive funds and banks' capital
title_full_unstemmed Captive funds and banks' capital
title_short Captive funds and banks' capital
title_sort Captive funds and banks' capital
url http://hdl.handle.net/10725/7415
http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/64912/