When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion
Purpose This paper builds upon managerial discretion literature to study the relationship between foreign ownership and bribery intensity. Design/methodology/approach Building on World Bank’s data of 9,386 firms from 125 countries over the period 2006–2018, this paper uses Tobit regression, ordered...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلفون آخرون: | , |
| التنسيق: | article |
| منشور في: |
2024
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| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/17552 https://doi.org/10.1108/CCSM-03-2023-0039 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php https://www.emerald.com/ccsm/article/31/1/87/1222613/When-MNEs-bribe-more-The-role-of-managerial |
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| _version_ | 1864513475285352448 |
|---|---|
| author | Teng, Da |
| author2 | Haj Youssef, Moustafa Salman Li, Chengchun |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Teng, Da Haj Youssef, Moustafa Salman Li, Chengchun |
| author_role | author |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Teng, Da Haj Youssef, Moustafa Salman Li, Chengchun |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2024 2024-03-01 2026-01-29T10:22:38Z 2026-01-29T10:22:38Z |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | 2059-5794 http://hdl.handle.net/10725/17552 https://doi.org/10.1108/CCSM-03-2023-0039 Teng, D., Haj Youssef, M. S., & Li, C. (2024). When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion. Cross Cultural & Strategic Management, 31(1), 87-115. http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php https://www.emerald.com/ccsm/article/31/1/87/1222613/When-MNEs-bribe-more-The-role-of-managerial |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv | en |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv | Cross Cultural & Strategic Management |
| dc.rights.*.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| description | Purpose This paper builds upon managerial discretion literature to study the relationship between foreign ownership and bribery intensity. Design/methodology/approach Building on World Bank’s data of 9,386 firms from 125 countries over the period 2006–2018, this paper uses Tobit regression, ordered probit and logit models to empirically test the hypotheses. Findings This paper finds that firms have higher bribery intensity when executives have a higher level of managerial discretion. Smaller firms with slack financial resources tend to bribe more when they face more government intervention, munificent and uncertain industrial environment. Originality/value Extant corruption literature has addressed the effects of external institutional settings and internal corporate governance on bribery offering among multinational enterprises (MNEs). How much, and under what condition do top executives matter in bribery activities are yet to be answered. This paper integrates the concept of managerial discretion with corruption and bribery literature and offers a potential answer to the above question. In addition, prior corruption and bribery literature have primarily studied bribery through either micro- or macro-level analysis. This paper adopts multiple-level of analyses and elucidates the foreign ownership and bribery relationship from the organizational and industrial levels. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | LAURepo_729de9d13fbffa57e23319e5bd237b88 |
| identifier_str_mv | 2059-5794 Teng, D., Haj Youssef, M. S., & Li, C. (2024). When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion. Cross Cultural & Strategic Management, 31(1), 87-115. |
| language_invalid_str_mv | en |
| network_acronym_str | LAURepo |
| network_name_str | Lebanese American University repository |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/17552 |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| spelling | When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretionTeng, DaHaj Youssef, Moustafa SalmanLi, ChengchunPurpose This paper builds upon managerial discretion literature to study the relationship between foreign ownership and bribery intensity. Design/methodology/approach Building on World Bank’s data of 9,386 firms from 125 countries over the period 2006–2018, this paper uses Tobit regression, ordered probit and logit models to empirically test the hypotheses. Findings This paper finds that firms have higher bribery intensity when executives have a higher level of managerial discretion. Smaller firms with slack financial resources tend to bribe more when they face more government intervention, munificent and uncertain industrial environment. Originality/value Extant corruption literature has addressed the effects of external institutional settings and internal corporate governance on bribery offering among multinational enterprises (MNEs). How much, and under what condition do top executives matter in bribery activities are yet to be answered. This paper integrates the concept of managerial discretion with corruption and bribery literature and offers a potential answer to the above question. In addition, prior corruption and bribery literature have primarily studied bribery through either micro- or macro-level analysis. This paper adopts multiple-level of analyses and elucidates the foreign ownership and bribery relationship from the organizational and industrial levels.Published2026-01-29T10:22:38Z2026-01-29T10:22:38Z20242024-03-01Articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article2059-5794http://hdl.handle.net/10725/17552https://doi.org/10.1108/CCSM-03-2023-0039Teng, D., Haj Youssef, M. S., & Li, C. (2024). When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion. Cross Cultural & Strategic Management, 31(1), 87-115.http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.phphttps://www.emerald.com/ccsm/article/31/1/87/1222613/When-MNEs-bribe-more-The-role-of-managerialenCross Cultural & Strategic Managementinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/175522026-01-29T10:22:38Z |
| spellingShingle | When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion Teng, Da |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion |
| title_full | When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion |
| title_fullStr | When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion |
| title_full_unstemmed | When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion |
| title_short | When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion |
| title_sort | When MNEs bribe more? The role of managerial discretion |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/17552 https://doi.org/10.1108/CCSM-03-2023-0039 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php https://www.emerald.com/ccsm/article/31/1/87/1222613/When-MNEs-bribe-more-The-role-of-managerial |