Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017)
This paper examines the impact of director co-option on the relationship between board structures and monitoring efficiency. We show that co-opted independent directors deflate the turnover-performance sensitivity, amplify CEO pay, and increase the likelihood of CEO duality. While non-co-opted indep...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
|---|---|
| التنسيق: | masterThesis |
| منشور في: |
2017
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/6734 https://doi.org/10.26756/th.2017.28 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/thesis.php |
| الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
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| _version_ | 1864513480658255872 |
|---|---|
| author | Abi Dames, Samira Ghassan |
| author_facet | Abi Dames, Samira Ghassan |
| author_role | author |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Abi Dames, Samira Ghassan |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2017-12-08T07:28:43Z 2017-12-08T07:28:43Z 2017 2017-12-08 2017-07-18 |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/6734 https://doi.org/10.26756/th.2017.28 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/thesis.php |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv | en |
| dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Lebanese American University |
| dc.rights.*.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Lebanese American University -- Dissertations Dissertations, Academic Directors of corporations -- Selection and appointment Cooptation |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017) |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Thesis info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
| description | This paper examines the impact of director co-option on the relationship between board structures and monitoring efficiency. We show that co-opted independent directors deflate the turnover-performance sensitivity, amplify CEO pay, and increase the likelihood of CEO duality. While non-co-opted independent directors enhance internal monitoring, co-opted independent board members are the worst monitors. We generally do not observe a substantial difference in the monitoring functionality of co-opted and non-co-opted inside board members. Our findings suggest that co-opted independent directors are the main driving factor behind the converse association between co-opted boards and internal monitoring. In addition, we suggest that independent directors appointed after the CEO resumes office are particularly costly to firms since they promote a non-efficient board monitoring environment. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | masterThesis |
| id | LAURepo_a36dc3ed63bcb0ebc63721796bdcf9ce |
| language_invalid_str_mv | en |
| network_acronym_str | LAURepo |
| network_name_str | Lebanese American University repository |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/6734 |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher.none.fl_str_mv | Lebanese American University |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| spelling | Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017)Abi Dames, Samira GhassanLebanese American University -- DissertationsDissertations, AcademicDirectors of corporations -- Selection and appointmentCooptationThis paper examines the impact of director co-option on the relationship between board structures and monitoring efficiency. We show that co-opted independent directors deflate the turnover-performance sensitivity, amplify CEO pay, and increase the likelihood of CEO duality. While non-co-opted independent directors enhance internal monitoring, co-opted independent board members are the worst monitors. We generally do not observe a substantial difference in the monitoring functionality of co-opted and non-co-opted inside board members. Our findings suggest that co-opted independent directors are the main driving factor behind the converse association between co-opted boards and internal monitoring. In addition, we suggest that independent directors appointed after the CEO resumes office are particularly costly to firms since they promote a non-efficient board monitoring environment.N/A1 hard copy: ix, 38 leaves, 30 cm. available at RNL.Bibliography : leaves 24-27.Lebanese American University2017-12-08T07:28:43Z2017-12-08T07:28:43Z20172017-12-082017-07-18Thesisinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesishttp://hdl.handle.net/10725/6734https://doi.org/10.26756/th.2017.28http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/thesis.phpeninfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/67342021-03-19T10:43:12Z |
| spellingShingle | Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017) Abi Dames, Samira Ghassan Lebanese American University -- Dissertations Dissertations, Academic Directors of corporations -- Selection and appointment Cooptation |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017) |
| title_full | Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017) |
| title_fullStr | Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017) |
| title_full_unstemmed | Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017) |
| title_short | Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017) |
| title_sort | Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017) |
| topic | Lebanese American University -- Dissertations Dissertations, Academic Directors of corporations -- Selection and appointment Cooptation |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/6734 https://doi.org/10.26756/th.2017.28 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/thesis.php |