Director co-option and monitoring efficiency. (c2017)
This paper examines the impact of director co-option on the relationship between board structures and monitoring efficiency. We show that co-opted independent directors deflate the turnover-performance sensitivity, amplify CEO pay, and increase the likelihood of CEO duality. While non-co-opted indep...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| التنسيق: | masterThesis |
| منشور في: |
2017
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/6734 https://doi.org/10.26756/th.2017.28 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/thesis.php |
| الوسوم: |
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