International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty
This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the probability of a regime shift increases in the first-period pollution stock, we examine the issue of coalition formation unde...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلفون آخرون: | , |
| التنسيق: | article |
| منشور في: |
2014
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| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/2969 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12108 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jpet.12108 |
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| _version_ | 1864513459742310400 |
|---|---|
| author | Nkuiya, Bruno |
| author2 | Marrouch, Walid Bahel, Eric |
| author2_role | author author |
| author_facet | Nkuiya, Bruno Marrouch, Walid Bahel, Eric |
| author_role | author |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Nkuiya, Bruno Marrouch, Walid Bahel, Eric |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2014 2016-01-28T11:59:15Z 2016-01-28T11:59:15Z 2016-01-28 |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | 1097-3923 http://hdl.handle.net/10725/2969 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12108 Nkuiya, B., Marrouch, W., & Bahel, E. (2014). International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty. Journal of Public Economic Theory 17 (5), 752-772. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jpet.12108 |
| dc.language.none.fl_str_mv | en |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv | Journal of Public Economic Theory |
| dc.rights.*.fl_str_mv | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Article info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion info:eu-repo/semantics/article |
| description | This paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the probability of a regime shift increases in the first-period pollution stock, we examine the issue of coalition formation under both fixed and dynamic membership. Our analysis suggests that endogenous uncertainty may increase participation. We find that full cooperation may be sustained, but only in the presence of endogenous uncertainty. Interestingly, when the shift in the environmental damage is large enough, the model provides a way to solve the “puzzle of small coalitions” found in the literature related to international environmental agreements. We also find that in period 1 (period 2) endogenous uncertainty leads to a lower (higher) pollution stock under dynamic membership as compared to the fixed membership case. |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| format | article |
| id | LAURepo_ca0a0aa1822f9349bbe27c3d7d2e9a51 |
| identifier_str_mv | 1097-3923 Nkuiya, B., Marrouch, W., & Bahel, E. (2014). International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty. Journal of Public Economic Theory 17 (5), 752-772. |
| language_invalid_str_mv | en |
| network_acronym_str | LAURepo |
| network_name_str | Lebanese American University repository |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/2969 |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| spelling | International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertaintyNkuiya, BrunoMarrouch, WalidBahel, EricThis paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the probability of a regime shift increases in the first-period pollution stock, we examine the issue of coalition formation under both fixed and dynamic membership. Our analysis suggests that endogenous uncertainty may increase participation. We find that full cooperation may be sustained, but only in the presence of endogenous uncertainty. Interestingly, when the shift in the environmental damage is large enough, the model provides a way to solve the “puzzle of small coalitions” found in the literature related to international environmental agreements. We also find that in period 1 (period 2) endogenous uncertainty leads to a lower (higher) pollution stock under dynamic membership as compared to the fixed membership case.PublishedN/A2016-01-28T11:59:15Z2016-01-28T11:59:15Z20142016-01-28Articleinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/article1097-3923http://hdl.handle.net/10725/2969http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12108Nkuiya, B., Marrouch, W., & Bahel, E. (2014). International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty. Journal of Public Economic Theory 17 (5), 752-772.https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jpet.12108enJournal of Public Economic Theoryinfo:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:laur.lau.edu.lb:10725/29692021-03-19T10:50:26Z |
| spellingShingle | International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty Nkuiya, Bruno |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty |
| title_full | International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty |
| title_fullStr | International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty |
| title_full_unstemmed | International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty |
| title_short | International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty |
| title_sort | International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty |
| url | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/2969 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/jpet.12108 https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/jpet.12108 |