Stakeholder theory in elections: Navigating political money, tribal tendencies, ethics, and the dark side of stakeholders
<h3>Abstract</h3><p dir="ltr">This conceptual article explores the relationship between stakeholder theory and electoral processes, focusing on the contemporary challenges and ethical implications of applying this theory, rooted in accountability, to the political realm....
محفوظ في:
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| منشور في: |
2024
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إضافة وسم
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| الملخص: | <h3>Abstract</h3><p dir="ltr">This conceptual article explores the relationship between stakeholder theory and electoral processes, focusing on the contemporary challenges and ethical implications of applying this theory, rooted in accountability, to the political realm. Drawing on an extensive literature review to develop the theory within the political field and elections, the analysis uncovers the factors and multifaceted issues that shape stakeholder engagement in electoral contexts, and the pervasive influence of political money on the sway of tribal affiliations and identity politics—which can result in misaligned representation and unfair policy outcomes that may harm the long‐term interests of stakeholders themselves. This underscores the need for regulatory reforms to enhance transparency and accountability in elections, advocating for ethical governance to balance broader public interests against narrow stakeholder interests. Ultimately, the research provides insights into improving global electoral processes and governance, calling for policies supporting equitable, accountable, and sustainable governance practices.</p><h2>Other Information</h2><p dir="ltr">Published in: Politics & Policy<br>License: <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" target="_blank">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</a><br>See article on publisher's website: <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/polp.12610" target="_blank">https://dx.doi.org/10.1111/polp.12610</a></p> |
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