Knowledge as a collective status
<p dir="ltr">While social epistemology is a diverse field, much of it still understands knowledge as an <i>individual status</i>—albeit an individual status that crucially depends on various social factors (such as testimony). Further, the literature on group knowledge un...
محفوظ في:
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| منشور في: |
2021
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إضافة وسم
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| _version_ | 1864513566219960320 |
|---|---|
| author | Jeremy Randel Koons (14779606) |
| author_facet | Jeremy Randel Koons (14779606) |
| author_role | author |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Jeremy Randel Koons (14779606) |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2021-05-05T03:00:00Z |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | 10.1111/phib.12224 |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv | https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Knowledge_as_a_collective_status/22258615 |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | CC BY 4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Philosophy and religious studies Philosophy Social epistemology Collective status Social function Truth-producing methodologies Traditional theories of knowledge Foundationalism Coherentism Pragmatist commitments |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Knowledge as a collective status |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Text Journal contribution info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion text contribution to journal |
| description | <p dir="ltr">While social epistemology is a diverse field, much of it still understands knowledge as an <i>individual status</i>—albeit an individual status that crucially depends on various social factors (such as testimony). Further, the literature on group knowledge until now has primarily focused on limited, specialized groups that may be said to know this or that as a group. I wish to argue, to the contrary, that <i>all</i> knowledge attributions ascribe a <i>collective status</i>; and that this follows more or less directly from an essential function of entitlement-ascriptions: Ascriptions of knowledge and entitlement serve a primarily social function in that they facilitate coordination by <i>maintaining consensus around true beliefs, true theories, and truth-producing methodologies</i>. This conclusion will shed light on ways in which traditional theories of knowledge (such as foundationalism and coherentism) fail to capture a central function of our epistemic practice.</p><h2>Other Information</h2><p dir="ltr">Published in: Analytic Philosophy<br>License: <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" target="_blank">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</a><br>See article on publisher's website: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12224" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12224</a></p> |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| id | Manara2_4892e0039f5ffffcdfd8e3e87ad2f79e |
| identifier_str_mv | 10.1111/phib.12224 |
| network_acronym_str | Manara2 |
| network_name_str | Manara2 |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:figshare.com:article/22258615 |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | CC BY 4.0 |
| spelling | Knowledge as a collective statusJeremy Randel Koons (14779606)Philosophy and religious studiesPhilosophySocial epistemologyCollective statusSocial functionTruth-producing methodologiesTraditional theories of knowledgeFoundationalismCoherentismPragmatist commitments<p dir="ltr">While social epistemology is a diverse field, much of it still understands knowledge as an <i>individual status</i>—albeit an individual status that crucially depends on various social factors (such as testimony). Further, the literature on group knowledge until now has primarily focused on limited, specialized groups that may be said to know this or that as a group. I wish to argue, to the contrary, that <i>all</i> knowledge attributions ascribe a <i>collective status</i>; and that this follows more or less directly from an essential function of entitlement-ascriptions: Ascriptions of knowledge and entitlement serve a primarily social function in that they facilitate coordination by <i>maintaining consensus around true beliefs, true theories, and truth-producing methodologies</i>. This conclusion will shed light on ways in which traditional theories of knowledge (such as foundationalism and coherentism) fail to capture a central function of our epistemic practice.</p><h2>Other Information</h2><p dir="ltr">Published in: Analytic Philosophy<br>License: <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" target="_blank">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</a><br>See article on publisher's website: <a href="http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12224" target="_blank">http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/phib.12224</a></p>2021-05-05T03:00:00ZTextJournal contributioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontextcontribution to journal10.1111/phib.12224https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Knowledge_as_a_collective_status/22258615CC BY 4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:figshare.com:article/222586152021-05-05T03:00:00Z |
| spellingShingle | Knowledge as a collective status Jeremy Randel Koons (14779606) Philosophy and religious studies Philosophy Social epistemology Collective status Social function Truth-producing methodologies Traditional theories of knowledge Foundationalism Coherentism Pragmatist commitments |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Knowledge as a collective status |
| title_full | Knowledge as a collective status |
| title_fullStr | Knowledge as a collective status |
| title_full_unstemmed | Knowledge as a collective status |
| title_short | Knowledge as a collective status |
| title_sort | Knowledge as a collective status |
| topic | Philosophy and religious studies Philosophy Social epistemology Collective status Social function Truth-producing methodologies Traditional theories of knowledge Foundationalism Coherentism Pragmatist commitments |