The information inelasticity of habits: Kahneman’s bounded rationality or Simon’s procedural rationality?
<p>Why would decision makers (DMs) adopt heuristics, priors, or in short “habits” that prevent them from optimally using pertinent information—even when such information is freely-available? One answer, Herbert Simon’s “procedural rationality” regards the question invalid: DMs do not, and in f...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | Elias L. Khalil (20518877) (author) |
|---|---|
| منشور في: |
2022
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| الموضوعات: | |
| الوسوم: |
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