Attribute-based proxy re-signature from standard lattices and its applications
<p dir="ltr">We introduce Attribute-based Proxy Re-Signatures (ABPRS), an extension of Proxy Re-Signatures (PRS), which allows a semi-trusted proxy to transform a signature of one entity into a signature of another, without revealing any signing key and information about the signer....
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | , , |
| Published: |
2021
|
| Subjects: | |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Summary: | <p dir="ltr">We introduce Attribute-based Proxy Re-Signatures (ABPRS), an extension of Proxy Re-Signatures (PRS), which allows a semi-trusted proxy to transform a signature of one entity into a signature of another, without revealing any signing key and information about the signer. The proposed primitive combines features of PRS and Attribute-based Signatures (ABS), which is useful for many applications (we show how to apply ABPRS to three such applications). We propose a unidirectional ABPRS construction based on the hardness of the Inhomogeneous Small Integer Solution (ISIS) problem in standard lattices. We show that the proposed unidirectional ABPRS construction is multi-hop, where the transformation can be performed multiple times on any signature. Furthermore, we prove that the proposed unidirectional ABPRS construction satisfies the security notion of no-signature-query unforgeability and (perfect) privacy, under the ISIS assumption. Finally, we show how to obtain a multi-hop unidirectional ABPRS scheme that satisfies a stronger security notion of co-selective unforgeability by using a generic transformation technique.</p><h2>Other Information</h2><p dir="ltr">Published in: Computer Standards & Interfaces<br>License: <a href="http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/" target="_blank">http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/</a><br>See article on publisher's website: <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2020.103499" target="_blank">https://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2020.103499</a></p> |
|---|