Dorm augmented college assignments
<p dir="ltr">In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously r...
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2024
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| Summary: | <p dir="ltr">In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously receive their college and dorm assignments. We first introduce the so-called “<i>Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance</i>” (<i>DDA</i>) and show that it is stable and efficient. However, it is not student-optimal stable. We then introduce our next mechanism, “<i>Student-Improving Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance</i>” (<i>SDDA</i>). It is mainly built on <i>DDA</i>, but with some extra steps to neutralize the student-harming rejection cycles. We show that <i>SDDA</i> is student-optimal stable, efficient, and unanimously preferred to <i>DDA</i> by students. Stability and strategy-proofness are incompatible, implying that neither of these mechanisms is strategy-proof. None of these mechanisms is more manipulable than the other; hence <i>SDDA </i>improves the students’ welfare without an extra strategic cost.</p><h2>Other Information</h2><p dir="ltr">Published in: Social Choice and Welfare<br>License: <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0" target="_blank">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0</a><br>See article on publisher's website: <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9" target="_blank">https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9</a></p> |
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