Dorm augmented college assignments
<p dir="ltr">In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously r...
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2024
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| _version_ | 1864513543580155904 |
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| author | Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan (21792878) |
| author_facet | Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan (21792878) |
| author_role | author |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan (21792878) |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2024-02-13T09:00:00Z |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | 10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9 |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv | https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Dorm_augmented_college_assignments/29650994 |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | CC BY 4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Commerce, management, tourism and services Marketing Economics Applied economics Education Education systems Dorm allocation Matching mechanisms Deferred Acceptance (DA) Stability Strategy-proofness Student-optimal mechanisms |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Dorm augmented college assignments |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Text Journal contribution info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion text contribution to journal |
| description | <p dir="ltr">In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously receive their college and dorm assignments. We first introduce the so-called “<i>Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance</i>” (<i>DDA</i>) and show that it is stable and efficient. However, it is not student-optimal stable. We then introduce our next mechanism, “<i>Student-Improving Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance</i>” (<i>SDDA</i>). It is mainly built on <i>DDA</i>, but with some extra steps to neutralize the student-harming rejection cycles. We show that <i>SDDA</i> is student-optimal stable, efficient, and unanimously preferred to <i>DDA</i> by students. Stability and strategy-proofness are incompatible, implying that neither of these mechanisms is strategy-proof. None of these mechanisms is more manipulable than the other; hence <i>SDDA </i>improves the students’ welfare without an extra strategic cost.</p><h2>Other Information</h2><p dir="ltr">Published in: Social Choice and Welfare<br>License: <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0" target="_blank">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0</a><br>See article on publisher's website: <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9" target="_blank">https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9</a></p> |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| id | Manara2_c5fd03d61039ceda85d244b1285b1a18 |
| identifier_str_mv | 10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9 |
| network_acronym_str | Manara2 |
| network_name_str | Manara2 |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:figshare.com:article/29650994 |
| publishDate | 2024 |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | CC BY 4.0 |
| spelling | Dorm augmented college assignmentsMustafa Oǧuz Afacan (21792878)Commerce, management, tourism and servicesMarketingEconomicsApplied economicsEducationEducation systemsDorm allocationMatching mechanismsDeferred Acceptance (DA)StabilityStrategy-proofnessStudent-optimal mechanisms<p dir="ltr">In college assignments, a common practice is that students receive their dorm allocation after the realization of college placements. This causes wasted resources and unfair allocation. To fix this, we consider a college assignment problem where students simultaneously receive their college and dorm assignments. We first introduce the so-called “<i>Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance</i>” (<i>DDA</i>) and show that it is stable and efficient. However, it is not student-optimal stable. We then introduce our next mechanism, “<i>Student-Improving Dorm Augmented Deferred Acceptance</i>” (<i>SDDA</i>). It is mainly built on <i>DDA</i>, but with some extra steps to neutralize the student-harming rejection cycles. We show that <i>SDDA</i> is student-optimal stable, efficient, and unanimously preferred to <i>DDA</i> by students. Stability and strategy-proofness are incompatible, implying that neither of these mechanisms is strategy-proof. None of these mechanisms is more manipulable than the other; hence <i>SDDA </i>improves the students’ welfare without an extra strategic cost.</p><h2>Other Information</h2><p dir="ltr">Published in: Social Choice and Welfare<br>License: <a href="https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0" target="_blank">https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0</a><br>See article on publisher's website: <a href="https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9" target="_blank">https://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9</a></p>2024-02-13T09:00:00ZTextJournal contributioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiontextcontribution to journal10.1007/s00355-024-01510-9https://figshare.com/articles/journal_contribution/Dorm_augmented_college_assignments/29650994CC BY 4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:figshare.com:article/296509942024-02-13T09:00:00Z |
| spellingShingle | Dorm augmented college assignments Mustafa Oǧuz Afacan (21792878) Commerce, management, tourism and services Marketing Economics Applied economics Education Education systems Dorm allocation Matching mechanisms Deferred Acceptance (DA) Stability Strategy-proofness Student-optimal mechanisms |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Dorm augmented college assignments |
| title_full | Dorm augmented college assignments |
| title_fullStr | Dorm augmented college assignments |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dorm augmented college assignments |
| title_short | Dorm augmented college assignments |
| title_sort | Dorm augmented college assignments |
| topic | Commerce, management, tourism and services Marketing Economics Applied economics Education Education systems Dorm allocation Matching mechanisms Deferred Acceptance (DA) Stability Strategy-proofness Student-optimal mechanisms |