A legislative framework for parliamentary oversight during national emergencies in Zimbabwe
<p dir="ltr">National Parliaments have a legal and institutional obligation to exercise oversight on the Executive arm of government in order to ensure transparency and accountability in government functions. However, following the designation of the Corona Virus (COVID-19) as a glob...
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2025
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| _version_ | 1849927644225732608 |
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| author | Enocent Nemuramba (22639383) |
| author_facet | Enocent Nemuramba (22639383) |
| author_role | author |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Enocent Nemuramba (22639383) |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2025-11-24T17:49:44Z |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | 10.25381/cput.30647369.v1 |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv | https://figshare.com/articles/dataset/A_legislative_framework_for_parliamentary_oversight_during_national_emergencies_in_Zimbabwe/30647369 |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Public administration Parliamentary oversight Emergency parliament Legislative continuity Executive accountability Emergency legislation |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | A legislative framework for parliamentary oversight during national emergencies in Zimbabwe |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Dataset info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion dataset |
| description | <p dir="ltr">National Parliaments have a legal and institutional obligation to exercise oversight on the Executive arm of government in order to ensure transparency and accountability in government functions. However, following the designation of the Corona Virus (COVID-19) as a global pandemic by the World Health Organisation in March 2020, most legislatures struggled to exercise continuous oversight over the emergency response measures that were being implemented by the Executive due to limited functionality during this period. The Parliament of Zimbabwe was no exception as the institution was side-lined by an Executive that chose to act unilaterally and govern through quasi legal instruments that bypassed Parliament.</p><p dir="ltr">The purpose of this study was to analyse the efficacy of the Parliament of Zimbabwe’s oversight function in holding the Executive arm of government accountable during national emergencies using lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic and to propose an emergency oversight model to guide Parliament in future national emergencies. The study was grounded in the theoretical foundations of the Principal-Agent Network, Democratic Legitimacy and New Institutionalism theories to critically review the power structures that exist between executive authority and parliamentary oversight during times of crisis. The primary argument was that the breakdown in the Principal-Agent relationship between Parliament and the Executive, coupled with the erosion of Democratic Legitimacy, were the consequences of a legal gap in the Civil Protection Act on the role of Parliament during emergencies and weaknesses in Parliament’s own rules of procedure to maintain legislative continuity. A New Institutional approach was needed to maintain parliamentary oversight and ensure legislative continuity during a national emergency.</p><p dir="ltr">Using the systematic review methodology, the study generated emergency oversight best practice from legislatures that managed to pro-actively sustain legislative continuity during COVID-19. The recurring theme from the findings of the review analysis was that, for emergency Parliaments to be institutionalised, emergency legislation should be amended to codify legislative oversight, rules of parliamentary procedure adapted to facilitate continuous legislative oversight over the Executive and mandatory reporting requirements placed on government during emergencies.</p><p dir="ltr">Findings from the systematic review informed the development of the Emergency Oversight Model for the Parliament of Zimbabwe. This model was validated through semi structured interviews that were conducted on a purposefully selected sample of Members of Parliament and heads of civic advocacy organisations in Zimbabwe. The validation process ensured that the model met its stated objective of achieving legislative continuity and oversight during national emergencies. The study’s practical significance extends beyond Zimbabwe. The Emergency Oversight Model provides a blueprint for legislatures using the parliamentary system to strengthen their emergency oversight frameworks. By adapting the model, they can achieve legislative continuity and hold governments to account during times of crisis.</p> |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| id | Manara_3b423767cf38fb278cebc25c3a6e9b55 |
| identifier_str_mv | 10.25381/cput.30647369.v1 |
| network_acronym_str | Manara |
| network_name_str | ManaraRepo |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:figshare.com:article/30647369 |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | CC BY-NC-SA 4.0 |
| spelling | A legislative framework for parliamentary oversight during national emergencies in ZimbabweEnocent Nemuramba (22639383)Public administrationParliamentary oversightEmergency parliamentLegislative continuityExecutive accountabilityEmergency legislation<p dir="ltr">National Parliaments have a legal and institutional obligation to exercise oversight on the Executive arm of government in order to ensure transparency and accountability in government functions. However, following the designation of the Corona Virus (COVID-19) as a global pandemic by the World Health Organisation in March 2020, most legislatures struggled to exercise continuous oversight over the emergency response measures that were being implemented by the Executive due to limited functionality during this period. The Parliament of Zimbabwe was no exception as the institution was side-lined by an Executive that chose to act unilaterally and govern through quasi legal instruments that bypassed Parliament.</p><p dir="ltr">The purpose of this study was to analyse the efficacy of the Parliament of Zimbabwe’s oversight function in holding the Executive arm of government accountable during national emergencies using lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic and to propose an emergency oversight model to guide Parliament in future national emergencies. The study was grounded in the theoretical foundations of the Principal-Agent Network, Democratic Legitimacy and New Institutionalism theories to critically review the power structures that exist between executive authority and parliamentary oversight during times of crisis. The primary argument was that the breakdown in the Principal-Agent relationship between Parliament and the Executive, coupled with the erosion of Democratic Legitimacy, were the consequences of a legal gap in the Civil Protection Act on the role of Parliament during emergencies and weaknesses in Parliament’s own rules of procedure to maintain legislative continuity. A New Institutional approach was needed to maintain parliamentary oversight and ensure legislative continuity during a national emergency.</p><p dir="ltr">Using the systematic review methodology, the study generated emergency oversight best practice from legislatures that managed to pro-actively sustain legislative continuity during COVID-19. The recurring theme from the findings of the review analysis was that, for emergency Parliaments to be institutionalised, emergency legislation should be amended to codify legislative oversight, rules of parliamentary procedure adapted to facilitate continuous legislative oversight over the Executive and mandatory reporting requirements placed on government during emergencies.</p><p dir="ltr">Findings from the systematic review informed the development of the Emergency Oversight Model for the Parliament of Zimbabwe. This model was validated through semi structured interviews that were conducted on a purposefully selected sample of Members of Parliament and heads of civic advocacy organisations in Zimbabwe. The validation process ensured that the model met its stated objective of achieving legislative continuity and oversight during national emergencies. The study’s practical significance extends beyond Zimbabwe. The Emergency Oversight Model provides a blueprint for legislatures using the parliamentary system to strengthen their emergency oversight frameworks. By adapting the model, they can achieve legislative continuity and hold governments to account during times of crisis.</p>2025-11-24T17:49:44ZDatasetinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiondataset10.25381/cput.30647369.v1https://figshare.com/articles/dataset/A_legislative_framework_for_parliamentary_oversight_during_national_emergencies_in_Zimbabwe/30647369CC BY-NC-SA 4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:figshare.com:article/306473692025-11-24T17:49:44Z |
| spellingShingle | A legislative framework for parliamentary oversight during national emergencies in Zimbabwe Enocent Nemuramba (22639383) Public administration Parliamentary oversight Emergency parliament Legislative continuity Executive accountability Emergency legislation |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | A legislative framework for parliamentary oversight during national emergencies in Zimbabwe |
| title_full | A legislative framework for parliamentary oversight during national emergencies in Zimbabwe |
| title_fullStr | A legislative framework for parliamentary oversight during national emergencies in Zimbabwe |
| title_full_unstemmed | A legislative framework for parliamentary oversight during national emergencies in Zimbabwe |
| title_short | A legislative framework for parliamentary oversight during national emergencies in Zimbabwe |
| title_sort | A legislative framework for parliamentary oversight during national emergencies in Zimbabwe |
| topic | Public administration Parliamentary oversight Emergency parliament Legislative continuity Executive accountability Emergency legislation |