Descriptive statistics of main variables.
<div><p>This study aims to reveal whether non-CEO inside directors can promote corporate research and development (R&D) investment. Using a panel data of 3,002 Chinese manufacturing listed firms from 2011 to 2021, we find that inside directors can significantly promote corporate R&am...
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2025
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| _version_ | 1852022878192533504 |
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| author | Jianqing Zhou (112889) |
| author2 | Yulian Peng (20691701) |
| author2_role | author |
| author_facet | Jianqing Zhou (112889) Yulian Peng (20691701) |
| author_role | author |
| dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv | Jianqing Zhou (112889) Yulian Peng (20691701) |
| dc.date.none.fl_str_mv | 2025-02-07T18:41:14Z |
| dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv | 10.1371/journal.pone.0317123.t002 |
| dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv | https://figshare.com/articles/dataset/Descriptive_statistics_of_main_variables_/28372577 |
| dc.rights.none.fl_str_mv | CC BY 4.0 info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv | Medicine Cell Biology Genetics Molecular Biology Biotechnology Ecology Sociology Science Policy Mental Health Infectious Diseases Space Science Biological Sciences not elsewhere classified alleviate agency conflicts additional analysis show reveal whether non promote corporate research ceo inside directors inside directors younger ceos xlink "> study aims small boards significantly weakened promotive effect panel data owned enterprises older ceos large boards important implications findings extend equity incentives economic consequences |
| dc.title.none.fl_str_mv | Descriptive statistics of main variables. |
| dc.type.none.fl_str_mv | Dataset info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion dataset |
| description | <div><p>This study aims to reveal whether non-CEO inside directors can promote corporate research and development (R&D) investment. Using a panel data of 3,002 Chinese manufacturing listed firms from 2011 to 2021, we find that inside directors can significantly promote corporate R&D investment. We also find that when the CEO has equity incentives to alleviate agency conflicts, the role of inside directors in promoting R&D investment is significantly weakened. Additional analysis show that the promotive effect of inside directors on R&D investment is significant only in samples of non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), male CEOs, older CEOs, and small boards, but not for the samples of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), female CEOs, younger CEOs, and large boards. These findings extend the scope of research on the economic consequences of inside directors and have important implications for the optimization and adjustment of corporate governance policies.</p></div> |
| eu_rights_str_mv | openAccess |
| id | Manara_ac7cf845ede28898c4946734c8bb12f7 |
| identifier_str_mv | 10.1371/journal.pone.0317123.t002 |
| network_acronym_str | Manara |
| network_name_str | ManaraRepo |
| oai_identifier_str | oai:figshare.com:article/28372577 |
| publishDate | 2025 |
| repository.mail.fl_str_mv | |
| repository.name.fl_str_mv | |
| repository_id_str | |
| rights_invalid_str_mv | CC BY 4.0 |
| spelling | Descriptive statistics of main variables.Jianqing Zhou (112889)Yulian Peng (20691701)MedicineCell BiologyGeneticsMolecular BiologyBiotechnologyEcologySociologyScience PolicyMental HealthInfectious DiseasesSpace ScienceBiological Sciences not elsewhere classifiedalleviate agency conflictsadditional analysis showreveal whether nonpromote corporate researchceo inside directorsinside directorsyounger ceosxlink ">study aimssmall boardssignificantly weakenedpromotive effectpanel dataowned enterprisesolder ceoslarge boardsimportant implicationsfindings extendequity incentiveseconomic consequences<div><p>This study aims to reveal whether non-CEO inside directors can promote corporate research and development (R&D) investment. Using a panel data of 3,002 Chinese manufacturing listed firms from 2011 to 2021, we find that inside directors can significantly promote corporate R&D investment. We also find that when the CEO has equity incentives to alleviate agency conflicts, the role of inside directors in promoting R&D investment is significantly weakened. Additional analysis show that the promotive effect of inside directors on R&D investment is significant only in samples of non-state-owned enterprises (non-SOEs), male CEOs, older CEOs, and small boards, but not for the samples of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), female CEOs, younger CEOs, and large boards. These findings extend the scope of research on the economic consequences of inside directors and have important implications for the optimization and adjustment of corporate governance policies.</p></div>2025-02-07T18:41:14ZDatasetinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersiondataset10.1371/journal.pone.0317123.t002https://figshare.com/articles/dataset/Descriptive_statistics_of_main_variables_/28372577CC BY 4.0info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccessoai:figshare.com:article/283725772025-02-07T18:41:14Z |
| spellingShingle | Descriptive statistics of main variables. Jianqing Zhou (112889) Medicine Cell Biology Genetics Molecular Biology Biotechnology Ecology Sociology Science Policy Mental Health Infectious Diseases Space Science Biological Sciences not elsewhere classified alleviate agency conflicts additional analysis show reveal whether non promote corporate research ceo inside directors inside directors younger ceos xlink "> study aims small boards significantly weakened promotive effect panel data owned enterprises older ceos large boards important implications findings extend equity incentives economic consequences |
| status_str | publishedVersion |
| title | Descriptive statistics of main variables. |
| title_full | Descriptive statistics of main variables. |
| title_fullStr | Descriptive statistics of main variables. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Descriptive statistics of main variables. |
| title_short | Descriptive statistics of main variables. |
| title_sort | Descriptive statistics of main variables. |
| topic | Medicine Cell Biology Genetics Molecular Biology Biotechnology Ecology Sociology Science Policy Mental Health Infectious Diseases Space Science Biological Sciences not elsewhere classified alleviate agency conflicts additional analysis show reveal whether non promote corporate research ceo inside directors inside directors younger ceos xlink "> study aims small boards significantly weakened promotive effect panel data owned enterprises older ceos large boards important implications findings extend equity incentives economic consequences |