Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion

This article explores the complex relationship between family firms and talent management practices. We use an international sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms to show that the relationship between family-owned firms and investment in talent management practices is mediated by the firm'...

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Main Author: Basco, Rodrigo (author)
Other Authors: Bassetti, Thomas (author), Dal Maso, Lorenzo (author), Lattanzi, Nicola (author)
Format: article
Published: 2021
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/11073/32508
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author Basco, Rodrigo
author2 Bassetti, Thomas
Dal Maso, Lorenzo
Lattanzi, Nicola
author2_role author
author
author
author_facet Basco, Rodrigo
Bassetti, Thomas
Dal Maso, Lorenzo
Lattanzi, Nicola
author_role author
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Basco, Rodrigo
Bassetti, Thomas
Dal Maso, Lorenzo
Lattanzi, Nicola
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2021-09-25
2025-11-25T10:00:16Z
2025-11-25T10:00:16Z
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv Basco, R., Bassetti, T., Dal Maso, L., & Lattanzi, N. (2021). Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion. Journal of Management and Governance, 27(1), 101–130. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-021-09599-1
1572-963X
https://hdl.handle.net/11073/32508
10.1007/s10997-021-09599-1
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv en
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-021-09599-1
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Talent management
Family ownership
Risk aversion
Moral hazard
Adverse selection
Industry competition
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Peer-Reviewed
Published version
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
description This article explores the complex relationship between family firms and talent management practices. We use an international sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms to show that the relationship between family-owned firms and investment in talent management practices is mediated by the firm's level of risk aversion, which is, in turn, moderated by industry competition. Risk-averse family-owned firms tend to invest less in talent management practices when industry competition is weak. In contrast, when competition increases, family-owned firms tend to invest in talent as much as non-family-owned firms do.
format article
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identifier_str_mv Basco, R., Bassetti, T., Dal Maso, L., & Lattanzi, N. (2021). Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion. Journal of Management and Governance, 27(1), 101–130. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-021-09599-1
1572-963X
10.1007/s10997-021-09599-1
language_invalid_str_mv en
network_acronym_str aus
network_name_str aus
oai_identifier_str oai:repository.aus.edu:11073/32508
publishDate 2021
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Springer
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository_id_str
spelling Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversionBasco, RodrigoBassetti, ThomasDal Maso, LorenzoLattanzi, NicolaTalent managementFamily ownershipRisk aversionMoral hazardAdverse selectionIndustry competitionThis article explores the complex relationship between family firms and talent management practices. We use an international sample of medium-sized manufacturing firms to show that the relationship between family-owned firms and investment in talent management practices is mediated by the firm's level of risk aversion, which is, in turn, moderated by industry competition. Risk-averse family-owned firms tend to invest less in talent management practices when industry competition is weak. In contrast, when competition increases, family-owned firms tend to invest in talent as much as non-family-owned firms do.Alma Mater Studiorum - Università di BolognaSpringer2025-11-25T10:00:16Z2025-11-25T10:00:16Z2021-09-25Peer-ReviewedPublished versioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfBasco, R., Bassetti, T., Dal Maso, L., & Lattanzi, N. (2021). Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion. Journal of Management and Governance, 27(1), 101–130. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-021-09599-11572-963Xhttps://hdl.handle.net/11073/3250810.1007/s10997-021-09599-1enhttps://doi.org/10.1007/s10997-021-09599-1oai:repository.aus.edu:11073/325082025-11-25T11:20:37Z
spellingShingle Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion
Basco, Rodrigo
Talent management
Family ownership
Risk aversion
Moral hazard
Adverse selection
Industry competition
status_str publishedVersion
title Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion
title_full Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion
title_fullStr Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion
title_full_unstemmed Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion
title_short Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion
title_sort Why and when do family firms invest less in talent management? The suppressor effect of risk aversion
topic Talent management
Family ownership
Risk aversion
Moral hazard
Adverse selection
Industry competition
url https://hdl.handle.net/11073/32508