Transnational Links in Rhino Poaching and the Black Market Price of Rhino Horns

The trends of rhino poaching in South Africa and India – major range states – have been remarkably similar over time. Organized criminal syndicates manage an illegal supply chain of rhino horns from poachers, middlemen, and corrupt authorities, to East Asian black-markets. In this paper, we use rhin...

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التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلف الرئيسي: Lopes, Adrian (author)
التنسيق: article
منشور في: 2019
الموضوعات:
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:http://hdl.handle.net/11073/16586
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author Lopes, Adrian
author_facet Lopes, Adrian
author_role author
dc.creator.none.fl_str_mv Lopes, Adrian
dc.date.none.fl_str_mv 2019
2020-02-02T09:44:56Z
2020-02-02T09:44:56Z
dc.format.none.fl_str_mv application/pdf
dc.identifier.none.fl_str_mv Lopes, A. A. (2019). Transnational links in rhino poaching and the black-market price of rhino horns. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 63(1), 95-115. doi:10.1111/1467-8489.12286
1467-8489
http://hdl.handle.net/11073/16586
10.1111/1467-8489.12286
dc.language.none.fl_str_mv en_US
dc.publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley Online Library
dc.relation.none.fl_str_mv https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-8489.12286
dc.subject.none.fl_str_mv Poaching
Oligopoly
Collusion
Black-market prices
dc.title.none.fl_str_mv Transnational Links in Rhino Poaching and the Black Market Price of Rhino Horns
dc.type.none.fl_str_mv Peer-Reviewed
Postprint
info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion
info:eu-repo/semantics/article
description The trends of rhino poaching in South Africa and India – major range states – have been remarkably similar over time. Organized criminal syndicates manage an illegal supply chain of rhino horns from poachers, middlemen, and corrupt authorities, to East Asian black-markets. In this paper, we use rhino poaching data from South Africa and India to examine the plausibility of transnational links and coordination in their supplies of rhino horns. We develop an innovative model of oligopolistic collusion in supply and find empirical evidence to support the theory, while controlling for rhino horn demand features, corruption, governance quality, and conservation policy. Furthermore, we propose an inventory management model of a criminal syndicate that controls the horn supply chain. The method retraces and forecasts black-market prices, and has potential applicability in estimating supply or demand elasticities. This paper is a first to suggest an oligopolistic feature of the poaching industry. It highlights the need to reorient conservation policy to account for possible coordination of rhino horn supplies between range states.
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identifier_str_mv Lopes, A. A. (2019). Transnational links in rhino poaching and the black-market price of rhino horns. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 63(1), 95-115. doi:10.1111/1467-8489.12286
1467-8489
10.1111/1467-8489.12286
language_invalid_str_mv en_US
network_acronym_str aus
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oai_identifier_str oai:repository.aus.edu:11073/16586
publishDate 2019
publisher.none.fl_str_mv Wiley Online Library
repository.mail.fl_str_mv
repository.name.fl_str_mv
repository_id_str
spelling Transnational Links in Rhino Poaching and the Black Market Price of Rhino HornsLopes, AdrianPoachingOligopolyCollusionBlack-market pricesThe trends of rhino poaching in South Africa and India – major range states – have been remarkably similar over time. Organized criminal syndicates manage an illegal supply chain of rhino horns from poachers, middlemen, and corrupt authorities, to East Asian black-markets. In this paper, we use rhino poaching data from South Africa and India to examine the plausibility of transnational links and coordination in their supplies of rhino horns. We develop an innovative model of oligopolistic collusion in supply and find empirical evidence to support the theory, while controlling for rhino horn demand features, corruption, governance quality, and conservation policy. Furthermore, we propose an inventory management model of a criminal syndicate that controls the horn supply chain. The method retraces and forecasts black-market prices, and has potential applicability in estimating supply or demand elasticities. This paper is a first to suggest an oligopolistic feature of the poaching industry. It highlights the need to reorient conservation policy to account for possible coordination of rhino horn supplies between range states.Wiley Online Library2020-02-02T09:44:56Z2020-02-02T09:44:56Z2019Peer-ReviewedPostprintinfo:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersioninfo:eu-repo/semantics/articleapplication/pdfLopes, A. A. (2019). Transnational links in rhino poaching and the black-market price of rhino horns. Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 63(1), 95-115. doi:10.1111/1467-8489.122861467-8489http://hdl.handle.net/11073/1658610.1111/1467-8489.12286en_UShttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/1467-8489.12286oai:repository.aus.edu:11073/165862024-08-22T12:18:17Z
spellingShingle Transnational Links in Rhino Poaching and the Black Market Price of Rhino Horns
Lopes, Adrian
Poaching
Oligopoly
Collusion
Black-market prices
status_str publishedVersion
title Transnational Links in Rhino Poaching and the Black Market Price of Rhino Horns
title_full Transnational Links in Rhino Poaching and the Black Market Price of Rhino Horns
title_fullStr Transnational Links in Rhino Poaching and the Black Market Price of Rhino Horns
title_full_unstemmed Transnational Links in Rhino Poaching and the Black Market Price of Rhino Horns
title_short Transnational Links in Rhino Poaching and the Black Market Price of Rhino Horns
title_sort Transnational Links in Rhino Poaching and the Black Market Price of Rhino Horns
topic Poaching
Oligopoly
Collusion
Black-market prices
url http://hdl.handle.net/11073/16586