Illegal Constitution of the Arbitral Tribunal as a Ground for Nullifying Arbitral Awards under the UAE Arbitration Law
This dissertation interrogates the “illegal constitution” of the arbitral tribunal as a self-standing ground for nullification under Article 53 of the UAE Arbitration Law (Federal Law No. 6 of 2018). Framed within the statute’s exhaustive nullification regime and the UAE’s adoption of the UNCITRAL M...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| منشور في: |
2025
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| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | https://bspace.buid.ac.ae/handle/1234/3766 |
| الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
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| الملخص: | This dissertation interrogates the “illegal constitution” of the arbitral tribunal as a self-standing ground for nullification under Article 53 of the UAE Arbitration Law (Federal Law No. 6 of 2018). Framed within the statute’s exhaustive nullification regime and the UAE’s adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law framework and New York Convention standards, the study isolates Article 53(1)(f), conflict with the parties’ agreement or the governing arbitration law in constituting the tribunal, as the primary legal foundation for assessing the validity of arbitral awards. The study primarily employs a doctrinal methodology, complemented by a targeted comparative analysis of Model Law jurisdictions and international case law pursuant to the New York Convention. It looks at the laws that govern the appointment, qualifications, independence, disclosure, and number of arbitrators, as well as the rules for challenging and replacing them. The analysis subsequently examines the application of these rules by UAE courts in annulment and enforcement proceedings, encompassing both institutional and ad hoc arbitrations. The main point is that tribunal constitution defects are seen as structural. If the appointment process breaks mandatory rules or agreed-upon procedures that the law protects, the defect nullifies the award without any review of the merits. At the same time, the case law shows how to keep things from being too broad: allowing people to waive their right to object if they do so too late, allowing people to separate parts of a decision that are tainted, and using the public policy exception in a way that doesn't turn minor formalities into nullity triggers. The analysis demonstrates that illegality in the constitution is not merely a procedural anomaly; it affects due process (procedural equality and the right to be heard), party autonomy (the principle that agreements on appointments and institutional rules must be honoured), and the international enforceability of awards. Keywords: Arbitration; UAE Arbitration Law; Arbitral Award; Article 53(1)(f); tribunal constitution; annulment; arbitrator appointment; UNCITRAL Model Law; New York Convention. |
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