Outside Director Stock Options and Dividend Policy
Agency theory suggests that dividends can be used to mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers. If director stock options are granted to align the interests of directors with shareholders, we anticipate that there will be less need for external governance mechanisms such as dividend...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | Boumosleh, Anwar (author) |
|---|---|
| مؤلفون آخرون: | Cline, Brandon N. (author) |
| التنسيق: | article |
| منشور في: |
2015
|
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/3849 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10693-013-0174-2 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10693-013-0174-2 |
| الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
لا توجد وسوم, كن أول من يضع وسما على هذه التسجيلة!
|
مواد مشابهة
-
Firm Investment Decisions, Dividend Policy, And Director Stock Options
حسب: Boumosleh, Anwar
منشور في: (2012) -
Should the Outsiders be Left Out? Director Stock Options, Expectations and Earnings Management
حسب: Boumosleh, Anwar
منشور في: (2012) -
Insiders and outsiders in corporate governance
حسب: Boumosleh, Anwar
منشور في: (2005) -
Director Compensation and the Reliability of Accounting Information
حسب: Boumosleh, Anwar
منشور في: (2009) -
Inside Directors, Managerial Competition, and the Asymmetric Information Problem
حسب: Boumosleh, Anwar
منشور في: (2009)