Outside Director Stock Options and Dividend Policy
Agency theory suggests that dividends can be used to mitigate agency problems between shareholders and managers. If director stock options are granted to align the interests of directors with shareholders, we anticipate that there will be less need for external governance mechanisms such as dividend...
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| Main Author: | Boumosleh, Anwar (author) |
|---|---|
| Other Authors: | Cline, Brandon N. (author) |
| Format: | article |
| Published: |
2015
|
| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/3849 http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10693-013-0174-2 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10693-013-0174-2 |
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