International environmental agreements
We survey the economics literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We classify the extant literature into the following categories: pure IEA games without linkages, which focus on a single externality stemming from global pollution; IEA games with side payments and issue linkages,...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | |
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| مؤلفون آخرون: | |
| التنسيق: | article |
| منشور في: |
2016
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| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/7314 http://dx.doi.org/10.1561/101.00000078 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/IRERE-0078 |
| الوسوم: |
إضافة وسم
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| الملخص: | We survey the economics literature on International Environmental Agreements (IEAs). We classify the extant literature into the following categories: pure IEA games without linkages, which focus on a single externality stemming from global pollution; IEA games with side payments and issue linkages, which consider carrot or stick mechanisms to lure cooperators or punish defectors; political economy models, which examine intra- and inter-governmental issues that affect international negotiations; design issues of IEAs; behavioral factors, which affect the willingness of countries to cooperate; and additional externalities resulting from open economy issues and adaptation, which interact with the global pollution externality and affect the free-riding incentives of countries. Based on this classification of the literature, we attempt to identify conditions under which an international environmental agreement would be sustainable and effective. |
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