Inside Directors, Managerial Competition, and the Asymmetric Information Problem
We posit that placing insiders on the board facilitates information flows to outside directors, mitigates the CEO's role as information gatekeeper, and allows managers to be more independent of the CEO. We find that inside directors are more prevalent in environments of greater information asym...
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| Format: | conferenceObject |
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2009
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/5921 http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.674082 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=674082 |
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