Director Compensation and the Reliability of Accounting Information
This paper studies the effect of incentive-based compensation on directors' monitoring of management. Using total accruals to measure the level of earnings management, I find that director stock option compensation is associated with higher levels of total accruals. I interpret this result to s...
محفوظ في:
| المؤلف الرئيسي: | Boumosleh, Anwar (author) |
|---|---|
| التنسيق: | article |
| منشور في: |
2009
|
| الوصول للمادة أونلاين: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/3261 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6288.2009.00228.x http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1540-6288.2009.00228.x/epdf |
| الوسوم: |
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مواد مشابهة
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