The limits of electoral engineering in divided societies
Electoral engineering determines prospects for centripetal politics in postconflict societies. Lebanon's postwar elections have been contested by interethnic electoral alliances in multi-ethnic electoral districts. Interethnic coalitions, vote pooling and bargaining have structured the results...
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| Format: | article |
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2006
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/2444 http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0008423906060185 |
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| Summary: | Electoral engineering determines prospects for centripetal politics in postconflict societies. Lebanon's postwar elections have been contested by interethnic electoral alliances in multi-ethnic electoral districts. Interethnic coalitions, vote pooling and bargaining have structured the results of these elections, as have the electoral laws demarcating the boundaries of electoral districts. Democratization, peace building and ethnic harmony have been the main victims of these cross-ethnic alliances, however. This paper seeks to explain this Lebanese puzzle by examining the institutional determinants of cross-ethnic electoral alliances in the 1992, 1996 and 2000 parliamentary elections. |
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