Transparent rules for deposing central bankers
I model flexible targeting with linear and quadratic loss function in the output gap and inflation rate. I find a form of targeting with one-sided dismissal rules attractive; it discourages the central banker from inflating and minimizes the probability of its dismissal in the presence of aggregate...
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| Format: | article |
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2015
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| Online Access: | http://hdl.handle.net/10725/3852 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.iref.2015.01.005 http://libraries.lau.edu.lb/research/laur/terms-of-use/articles.php http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1059056015000118 |
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