A linear relation between and when player j uses a two-point autocratic strategy with against random memory-one strategies.

محفوظ في:

التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلف الرئيسي:	Masahiko Ueda (4356865) (author)
مؤلفون آخرون:	Shoma Yagi (22794646) (author), Genki Ichinose (431253) (author)
منشور في:	2025
الموضوعات:	Sociology Science Policy Infectious Diseases enforcing linear relationships adaptively learning player unilaterally control payoffs determinant strategy exists cannot promote collusion strategies called zero realized whereas defection cournot oligopoly game promote collusion determinant strategy determinant strategies cournot introduced tacit collusion autocratic strategies simplest game shot game dilemma game xlink "> theoretic model tacitly collude quite different negative impact mutual cooperation maximizing behavior many attempts infinitely repeated firm results findings elucidate find zero fair zero direct reciprocity broader situations average payoff
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A linear relation between and when player <i>j</i> uses a two-point autocratic strategy with against random memory-one strategies.